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INTRODUCTION 
Title VII was twenty-five years old when Kimberlé Crenshaw published her 
path-breaking article introducing “intersectionality” to critical legal 
scholarship.1 By the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached its thirtieth 
birthday, the intersectionality critique had come of age, generating a 
sophisticated subfield and producing many articles that remain classics in the 
field of anti-discrimination law and beyond.2 Employment discrimination law 
was not the only target of intersectionality critics, but Title VII’s failure to 
 
∗ Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Essay 
draws on my previous scholarship, especially SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: 
FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011). Special thanks to Linda 
McClain and Khiara Bridges for hosting a wonderful symposium, to Smita Ghosh for superb 
research assistance, and to Jared Iverson and the staff of the Boston University Law Review 
for their editorial prowess. 
1 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. I adopt, for purposes of this Essay, a broad and admittedly 
imprecise definition of the term “intersectionality.” For a salutary reading of the term’s 
ambiguity, see Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science 
Perspective on what Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67 (2008). 
2 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 1; Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female 
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 
539; Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and 
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. 
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capture and ameliorate the particular experiences of women of color loomed 
large in this early legal literature.3 Courts proved especially reluctant to 
recognize multi-dimensional discrimination against African American female 
plaintiffs, reenacting the phenomenon encapsulated in the title of a 1982 Black 
feminist anthology: All the Women are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But 
Some of Us Are Brave.4 By the mid-1990s, most courts no longer rejected 
intersectional claims out of hand.5 But well into the twenty-first century, 
scholars find that “complex discrimination” claimants fare even worse than 
other employment discrimination plaintiffs, facing both structural and 
ideological barriers to recognition and redress.6 
Although the term “intersectionality” dates to the late 1980s, the concept’s 
history predates the Civil Rights Act itself.7 Moreover, what we now call 
intersectionality crucially shaped Title VII from its inception. Over the past 
two decades, historians have uncovered the critical role of intersectionality—
and of women of color—in pre-Civil Rights Act activism against sex- and 
race-based employment discrimination; in the enactment of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination amendment; in early enforcement efforts; in advocacy to 
expand the definition of sex discrimination (to include, for instance, sexual 
harassment, pregnancy discrimination, and discrimination against unmarried 
 
3 See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text. 
4 ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE 
BRAVE: BLACK WOMEN’S STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982). See also, e.g., THIS 
BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherríe Moraga & 
Gloria Anzaldúa eds., 1981); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); BELL 
HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 13 (1981). 
5 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 
1980) (“[D]iscrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of 
discrimination against black men or white women.”); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 
1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against 
any individual because of race or because of sex. ‘The use of the word “or” evidences 
Congress’ intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed 
characteristics.’” (quoting Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032)); Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 
1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As other courts have recognized, where two bases for 
discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components.”). 
6 See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of 
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 992 (2011) 
(“[P]laintiffs who make intersectional claims, alleging that they were discriminated against 
based on more than one ascriptive characteristic, are only half as likely to win their cases as 
are other plaintiffs.”); Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a 
Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 234-35 (2006) (proposing an 
amendment to Title VII because intersectional plaintiffs “lack[] full recourse”); Minna J. 
Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1439, 1440 (2009) (“A sample of summary judgment decisions reveals that employers 
prevail on multiple claims at a rate of 96 percent, as compared to 73 percent on employment 
discrimination claims in general.”). 
7 See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text. 
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parents); and in the development of constitutional sex equality arguments that 
influenced, and were shaped by, the evolution of Title VII.8 
History, legal theory, and (to a lesser extent) anti-discrimination doctrine all 
incorporate accounts—explicit and implicit—of the relationship between 
intersectionality and Title VII. Rarely, however, do these accounts intersect (so 
to speak). This Essay is a preliminary and partial effort to put those disparate 
literatures in conversation, and to focus attention on the pre-history of 
intersectionality and Title VII. Doing so reveals how the insights Crenshaw 
and her contemporaries brilliantly theorized and elaborated during Title VII’s 
second quarter-century are part of a longer and more complicated history than 
we often acknowledge.9 
 
8 See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2011) [hereinafter MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE] (examining the roots of 
feminist legal advocacy in intersectional experience); SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER 
FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 176-206 (1998) (describing black 
feminists’ “pursui[t of] feminist goals outside both the autonomous women’s movement and 
the civil rights movement”); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF 
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 117-54 (2006) (recognizing the pivotal role of African 
American feminists in shaping the early history of Title VII); CARRIE N. BAKER, THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT passim (2008) (chronicling black 
women’s pivotal roles as activists, plaintiffs, and government officials in the struggle 
against sexual harassment); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, 
AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 226-33, 240-48, 
225-59, 262-68, 277-80, 283-88 (2001) (discussing evolving views about the relationship 
between race and sex discrimination in the 1960s and 1970s); LINDA K. KERBER, NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 184-
99 (1998) (relating Pauli Murray’s role in the struggle for race and sex equality in jury 
service); Eileen Boris, The Gender of Discrimination: Race, Sex, and Fair Employment, 
in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, INTERPRETATION AND 
PRACTICE 273, 273 (Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith eds., 2003) (describing 
neglect of “interactive discrimination” faced by black women); Eileen Boris, Ledbetter’s 
Continuum: Race, Gender, and Pay Discrimination, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS 
ON WOMEN AND LAW 240 (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracy Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) (describing 
the interaction between race and sex in early pay discrimination cases); Serena Mayeri, 
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. 
L. REV. 755, 759 (2004) [hereinafter Mayeri, Constitutional Choices] (exploring feminists’ 
“dual constitutional strategy” and its relationship to “the interconnectedness of race and sex 
equality”); Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender 
Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1046, 1052-72 (2001) 
[hereinafter Mayeri, A Common Fate] (investigating “the particular historical context of the 
1960s in which race-sex analogies emerged as a central component of modern feminist legal 
thought”). 
9 Cf. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of 
the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 (2005). 
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I. THE MYTHOLOGY OF TITLE VII’S SEX AMENDMENT 
For much of the Civil Rights Act’s first quarter-century, the origins of Title 
VII’s “sex” amendment10 were shrouded in layers of mythology and 
(sometimes willful) misunderstanding. Skeptical commentators and courts 
routinely dismissed the amendment as a “joke” or “fluke,” born of 
segregationist antipathy to African American civil rights.11 At best, went the 
conventional wisdom, Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination was an ill-
conceived afterthought; at worst, a “killer amendment” designed to scuttle the 
civil rights bill and destined to undermine its primary purpose.12 Government 
officials, including early EEOC members, explicitly prioritized race 
discrimination and denigrated the sex amendment’s importance.13 This 
dismissive attitude toward the sex amendment, together with increasingly 
organized feminist activism and unexpectedly voluminous sex discrimination 
complaints flooding the EEOC, galvanized a resurgent women’s movement to 
demand real protection against employment discrimination.14 
Early and influential accounts of the Civil Rights Act’s enactment 
perpetuated the myth that the sex amendment’s passage was little more than 
the accidental byproduct of segregationist mischief.15 This myth of the sex 
amendment as “joke” or “fluke” proved remarkably resilient, despite early 
revelations about the involvement of the National Woman’s Party (“NWP”) 
and female members of Congress in pushing for an amendment banning sex 
discrimination.16 In some instances, feminists mobilized the myth for critical 
 
10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). 
11 JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION 54 (1975); see also Mayeri, A 
Common Fate, supra note 8, at 1063. 
12 See sources cited infra note 15. 
13 See, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 185. 
14 On the EEOC’s failure to enforce the sex discrimination provision of Title VII, see 
FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 76-79; HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 205-32 (1990); CYNTHIA HARRISON, 
ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 192-209 (1988); 
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 246-47. 
15 See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 234 (1985) (“[The proposed sex amendment] did 
not come about through strenuous lobbying by women’s groups; it was the result of a 
deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it.”); Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 79 (1964) (“The sex 
amendment can best be described as an orphan, since neither the proponents nor the 
opponents of Title VII seem to have felt any responsibility for its presence in the bill.”); 
Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778, 
791 (1965) (“The bill’s history does reveal that, as the debate over racial aspects of the Civil 
Rights Act grew more heated, foes of its passage drafted an amendment to include sex, 
presumably designed to defeat the entire act.”). 
16 See, e.g., PATRICIA G. ZELMAN, WOMEN, WORK, AND NATIONAL POLICY: THE 
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purposes, as when Catharine MacKinnon wrote in a landmark 1991 article that 
“sex discrimination in private employment was forbidden under federal law 
only in a last minute joking ‘us boys’ attempt to defeat Title VII’s prohibition 
on racial discrimination.”17 Courts, too, used the “joke” theory to various ends 
when discussing Title VII’s legislative history.18 
The scholars and commentators who discredited the notion that Title VII’s 
sex amendment was a fluke highlighted the NWP’s behind-the-scenes 
advocacy and the House floor debate, which featured Rep. Martha Griffiths’s 
skillful manipulation of segregationist concern for the “White Christian 
Woman of United States Origin.”19  A new picture emerged from early 
literature debunking the “joke” myth: now the key actors in the story of the sex 
amendment’s enactment included congresswomen such as Griffiths and 
Katherine St. George; NWP leaders such as Alice Paul, Emma Guffey Miller, 
and Nina Horton Avery; and, in some versions, the journalist May Craig.20 
This story improved upon the conventional narrative, to be sure. But it may 
inadvertently have helped to perpetuate the misconception that the sex 
 
KENNEDY-JOHNSON YEARS 60 (1982); Caruthers Gholson Berger, Equal Pay, Equal 
Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 
326, 336-37 (1970) (“[T]he accusation of misogynists that the passage of the sex 
discrimination provision was Representative Smith’s joke contrived to hurt racial minorities 
is utterly untrue.”); Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress 
Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. 
REV. 453, 453-54 (1980) (“The conventional view is that sex was added as a protected class 
to the employment discrimination title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) for the purpose 
of defeating it by making it unacceptable to some of its supporters or by laughing it to death. 
. . . And [the conventional view] is wrong.”). 
17 She continued: “Sex was added as a prohibited ground of discrimination when this 
attempted reductio ad absurdum failed and the law passed anyway.” Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-84 (1991). 
For more examples, see Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at 
the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 137, 139-40 (1997). 
18 See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (2012) (“[C]ourts commonly cited the lack of legislative history 
attending Title VII’s sex provision as a reason for interpreting the statute narrowly.”); 
Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public 
Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
409, 425-34 (2009) (tracing judicial treatment of the sex provision’s legislative history). 
19 Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 772; see also GRAHAM, supra note 14, 
at 137; Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of 
Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37, 37-56 
(describing political pressure for the sex amendment from the NWP and from Griffiths); Jo 
Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public 
Policy, 9 L. & INEQ. 163, 172-79 (1991) (describing the NWP’s efforts to have “sex” added 
to the Civil Rights Act). 
20 See Brauer, supra note 19, at 39-45. 
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amendment’s primary constituencies were white women and lawmakers who 
were indifferent, or even hostile, toward racial justice and civil rights. 
II. THE INTERSECTIONAL ORIGINS OF TITLE VII’S SEX AMENDMENT 
During Title VII’s second quarter-century, a consensus emerged among 
historians that the sex amendment should be seen not only as the product of an 
unholy alliance between white feminists and segregationist conservatives, but 
also as reinforcing a longer tradition of advocacy that married the causes of 
racial justice and women’s rights. True, the House sex amendment debate 
depicted a prohibition on sex discrimination as necessary to prevent white 
women from standing “last at the hiring gate,”21 and prominent progressive 
Democrats, such as Edith Green of Oregon, opposed the amendment for fear it 
would sink the civil rights legislation altogether.22 But when the bill reached 
the Senate, African American lawyer Pauli Murray, a veteran of the civil rights 
movement and of personal battles against “Jane Crow,” wrote an influential 
memorandum designed to persuade civil rights supporters that the sex 
amendment was integral, rather than antithetical, to Title VII’s goals.23 
Circulated to members of Congress and the Johnson administration, Murray’s 
memo presciently reframed the sex amendment as a unifying, rather than 
divisive, force within the broader civil rights and women’s advocacy 
communities.24 
The memo, circulated in April 1964 as the sex discrimination provision 
approved by the House in February faced danger in the Senate, was written in 
the style of a brief.25 Murray first laid out the arguments for and against the sex 
amendment as articulated during the House debate: opponents concerned about 
the fate of the civil rights bill worried, above all, that the sex amendment 
would “clutter up the bill and jeopardize its primary purpose” of “end[ing] 
discrimination against Negroes.”26 And the amendment’s most vocal 
 
21 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffiths). 
22 See id. at 2581 (statement of Edith Green) (“[L]et us not add any amendment that 
would place in jeopardy in any way our primary objective of ending that discrimination that 
is most serious, most urgent, most tragic, and most widespread against the Negroes of our 
country.”). Edith Green herself was an avid proponent of women’s rights, having 
championed a much more capacious version of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 than the 
legislation that resulted. On Green and the Equal Pay Act, see DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE 
OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 163, 165-66 (2004); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 236-
37; see also HARRISON, supra note 14, at 100, 102. 
23 Pauli Murray, Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, 
Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment 
Because of Sex (Apr. 14, 1964) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 85, Folder 1485, on file 
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Murray, 
Title VII Memorandum]; see also Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 774. 
24 See Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 774. 
25 Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 23. 
26 Id. at 2. Opponents also argued that “the amendment would be an entering wedge to 
  
2015] INTERSECTIONALITY AND TITLE VII 719 
 
proponents framed the sex discrimination provision as necessary to protect 
white women, “since employers, fearing prosecution for race discrimination 
under the act, will tend to give preference to Negro women (and Negro men) 
over white women.”27 
Murray’s memo critically reframed the debate. Instead of a contest pitting 
“Negroes” against “women” or “Negro women and men” against “white 
women,” Murray’s analysis made the fate of “Negro women” the ultimate 
barometer of the civil rights bill’s success. “[I]f there is no ‘sex’ amendment,” 
Murray warned, 
both Negro and white women will share a common fate of discrimination, 
since it is exceedingly difficult for a Negro woman to determine whether 
or not she is being discriminated against because of race or sex. These 
two types of discrimination are so closely entertwined [sic] and so similar 
that Negro women are uniquely qualified to affirm their 
interrelatedness.28 
Murray, who had often spoken of the “twin immoralities” of “Jim and Jane 
Crow,” theorized black women’s singular experience in language that 
anticipated the concept Crenshaw would term “intersectionality” a quarter-
century later.29 
Murray’s Title VII memo was part of a larger strategy that predated the 
Civil Rights Act’s enactment. Murray had long protested the exclusion of 
“Negro women” from visible leadership positions in the civil rights movement, 
and by the early 1960s, she had become a key figure in a revitalized interracial 
feminist movement.30 An earlier memorandum—authored by Murray when she 
served on the Civil and Political Rights Committee of the President’s 
Commission on the Status of Women—had revolutionized feminist 
constitutional strategy by urging that advocates for women circumvent the 
divisive Equal Rights Amendment controversy by pursuing a Fourteenth 
Amendment litigation campaign modeled on the NAACP Legal Defense 
 
destroy protective legislation favorable to women”; that “Congress has not had time to study 
this proposal; there is no legislative record or findings and hearings should be held before 
any vote is taken on the amendment”; and that “biological differences between men and 
women pose different problems with respect to employment, and thus Congress should wait 
until further studies are made.” Id. at 2-3. See also 110 CONG. REC. 2578-84 (1964). 
27 Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3. 
28 Id. at 20. 
29 Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 774, 806. 
30 See SARAH AZARANSKY, THE DREAM IS FREEDOM: PAULI MURRAY AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRATIC FAITH 62 (2011); MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 119-23; MAYERI, REASONING 
FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 16-23; Serena Mayeri, Pauli Murray and the Twentieth-
Century Quest for Legal and Social Equality, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQ. 80, 88 (2013). On 
Murray’s earlier activism, see generally GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE 
RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1919-1950 (2008); KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING 
THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012). 
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Fund’s successful desegregation efforts.31 Murray’s strategic use of analogies 
between race and sex discrimination linked civil rights and feminism both 
rhetorically and practically.32 
Crucially, Murray understood “Negro women’s” central importance to the 
civil rights struggle through the lens of history—a history replete with conflict 
between and within movements for racial justice and women’s rights. These 
movements ignored the imperatives of coalition at their peril, Murray 
warned.33 Past failures to unite—for instance, the post-Civil War rift between 
advocates of black male enfranchisement and women’s suffrage—had not only 
obscured African American women’s interests, but also fatally undermined an 
alliance that might have prevented everything from post-Reconstruction 
retrenchment to lynching.34 
Murray linked the need for a sex discrimination prohibition not only to 
black women’s underrepresentation in lucrative jobs, but also to their 
overrepresentation among women who provided the sole or primary support 
for their families. “In a more sharply defined struggle than is apparent in any 
other social group in the United States, [the Negro woman] is literally engaged 
in a battle for sheer survival,” she wrote.35 The “Negro woman,” Murray 
explained, had trouble “finding a mate, remains single longer and in higher 
incidence, bears more children, is in the labor market longer, has less 
education, earns less, is widowed earlier and carries a heavier economic burden 
as a family head than her white counterpart.”36 For many of her male 
contemporaries, both inside and outside the civil rights movement, the cure for 
these ills was to shore up black men’s employment prospects through the civil 
rights bill and other legislation. For Murray, however, such an approach was a 
halfway measure at best. “Title VII without the ‘sex’ amendment would 
benefit Negro males primarily and thus offer genuine equality of opportunity to 
only half of the potential Negro work force,” Murray wrote.37 Given that “[t]he 
Negro woman must be prepared to support herself and others for a 
considerable period of her life . . . if civil rights legislation is to be effective, it 
must of necessity include protection against discrimination in employment by 
reason of sex.”38 
Murray’s intersectional position also helped her to foresee the essential role 
an inclusive Title VII could play in uniting social movements through a 
convergence of common interests. Employers historically exploited workers 
 
31 See Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 8, at 1057-58. 
32 I have discussed this phenomenon at greater length in earlier works. See generally 
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8; Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 8. 
33 See Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4-9. 
34 Id. at 9-11. 
35 Id. at 21. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 20-21. 
38 Id. at 23. 
  
2015] INTERSECTIONALITY AND TITLE VII 721 
 
through divide-and-conquer tactics, especially in “semi-skilled and unskilled 
categories where women and Negroes are found in large numbers.”39 Murray 
predicted that “[u]nless all workers are reassured that they will have equal 
employment opportunities bitter competition and conflict with racial 
implications will continue . . . thereby defeating the main purpose” of the bill.40 
Hope that the inclusion of sex in Title VII would help to bridge these divisions 
and address the particular needs of “Negro women” suffused Murray’s memo. 
III. TITLE VII, INTERSECTIONALITY, AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS 
COALITION41 
Title VII’s passage was indeed a watershed in the relationship between the 
civil rights and feminist movements. Its enactment swiftly and decisively 
destroyed the alliance of convenience between conservative white feminists 
and segregationists. Title VII also united and galvanized advocates for women 
long divided over sex-specific protective labor legislation. Moreover, by tying 
the fates of race and sex discrimination claims together, Title VII—perhaps 
more than any other legislative enactment—cemented a sometimes uneasy, but 
nonetheless crucial, alliance between civil rights and women’s rights. By the 
early 1970s, the category “women and minorities”—virtually unthinkable just 
a few years earlier—had entered the American political lexicon. Title VII and 
the advocates who ensured its enforcement could claim much of the credit.42 
Title VII took effect in 1965, the same year that the Moynihan Report 
crystallized a consensus among commentators and policymakers that restoring 
African American men to their proper role as breadwinning heads of 
households was a prerequisite for racial progress.43 In the late 1960s, civil 
rights leaders not only prioritized African American male employment, but 
many viewed equal employment opportunity for women of all races as 
antithetical to achieving racial justice and equality.44 At the same time, some 
longtime advocates for labor and civil rights, including Murray herself, 
worried that organizations like the National Organization for Women 
(“NOW”) stifled the voices of women with multifaceted identities and political 
commitments.45 
 
39 Id. at 19. 
40 Id. 
41 The discussion in this Part incorporates text adapted from MAYERI, REASONING FROM 
RACE, supra note 8. 
42 See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 41-75; see also MACLEAN, 
supra note 8, at 154; Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 773-77 (illustrating 
how Title VII’s passage “provided an unprecedented link between struggles for racial justice 
and sex equality”). 
43 See Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 
B.U. L. REV. 729, 730 (2013) and sources cited therein. 
44 Id. at 731.  
45 See HARTMANN, supra note 8, at 189-90; MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 
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Against this backdrop, a small cadre of black feminist lawyers, activists, and 
government officials insisted that women’s advancement in the workplace and 
egalitarian partnerships with men were crucial to realizing the promise of the 
civil rights movement. The key figures in this story were African American 
women who used their multi-dimensional identities and their positions at the 
intersection of the civil rights and women’s movements to promote a 
distinctive brand of feminist activism and an expansive interpretation of Title 
VII’s promise. This black feminist legal agenda responded directly to the 
Moynihanian consensus and to the limitations of both mainstream liberal 
feminism and civil rights advocacy.46 
No mere outsiders or gadflies, these women were enormously influential in 
Title VII’s early development. Pauli Murray’s seminal 1965 article Jane Crow 
and the Law, co-authored with Mary Eastwood, encapsulated the feminist case 
for vigorous enforcement of anti-sex discrimination norms under Title VII and 
the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Murray’s call for a women’s “March on 
Washington” to protest the EEOC’s failure to enforce the sex amendment 
made national headlines,48 and foreshadowed her role as co-founder of NOW 
in 1966.49 As chair of the New York City Human Rights Commission in the 
early 1970s, Eleanor Holmes Norton vigorously investigated, publicized, and 
expanded the scope of antidiscrimination laws: she prioritized claims based on 
sex as well as race, and included low-income women and women of color as 
key constituencies.50 As President of NOW and co-founder of Black Women 
Organized for Action in the early 1970s, Aileen Hernandez joined Murray and 
Norton in building coalitions between white-dominated women’s 
organizations, male-dominated civil rights groups, and a growing contingent of 
self-identified black feminists.51 
 
8, at 36; Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 790-92. 
46 See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 41-42; MACLEAN, supra note 8, 
at 153; PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT: AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE 356-57 
(1987). 
47 Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and 
Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965). 
48 Pauli Murray, Remarks at the Women and Title VII Conference, National Council of 
Women of the United States 13 (Oct. 12, 1965) (Mary Eastwood Papers, MC 596, Box 4, 
Folder 34, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University); 
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 23-24; Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, 
supra note 8, at 776. 
49 See Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 784. 
50 See MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 143-45; MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 
8, at 46-49. 
51 See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 45-47. On Black Women 
Organized for Action, the National Black Feminist Organization, and other organized 
African American feminist groups in the 1970s, see KIMBERLY SPRINGER, LIVING FOR THE 
REVOLUTION: BLACK FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS, 1968-1980 (2005). See also PAULA 
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN 
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If the intersectional identities and experiences of women such as Murray, 
Norton, and Hernandez critically shaped their advocacy and motivated their 
coalition-building efforts, so too did the maturation of Title VII litigation and 
enforcement unite the civil rights and feminist movements to an unprecedented 
degree. Whereas in the mid- to late-1960s the women’s movement seemed like 
a threat rather than a boon to the civil rights movement, by the early 1970s, 
civil rights leaders and their congressional supporters recognized women’s 
rights advocates as indispensable allies. This dramatic and relatively rapid 
transformation owed a considerable debt to the political economy of 
employment discrimination law. Cases such as Phillips v. Martin-Marietta 
Corp.,52 which challenged a policy excluding mothers of preschool-age 
children from employment, made clear that a broad interpretation of Title VII’s 
bona fide occupational qualification exception could endanger the rights of 
racial and religious minorities as well. Ida Phillips was white and widowed, 
“but her plight as a [single] working mother resembled that of many African 
American women.”53 Recognizing the possible spillover effects in race 
discrimination law, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) took Phillips’s 
case, arguing that the “‘primary adverse impact’ of Martin-Marietta’s policy 
was ‘on blacks,’ since ‘[m]ore than twice as many non-white mothers as white 
mothers’ were ‘heads of families.’”54 Feminists, too, used the Phillips case to 
make common cause with the civil rights movement. 
Feminists capitalized on women’s potential political and electoral clout, as 
well as “Title VII’s linkage of race and sex” to win over skeptical civil rights 
leaders.55 By the early 1970s, feminists and civil rights advocates together 
championed extending the EEOC’s jurisdiction to educational institutions and 
state and local governments. As lawmakers debated the amendments to Title 
VII, the Congressional Record teemed with earnest declarations about the 
menace of sex discrimination.56 Civil rights and women’s rights advocates 
collaborated in several national actions and lawsuits against large companies 
such as DuPont, Hughes Tool, Firestone, and the Big Three automakers.57 A 
coalition of feminist and civil rights groups won a landmark consent decree 
with AT&T, addressing occupational segregation uncovered by the African 
American economist Phyllis Wallace.58 In short, by 1973, thanks in no small 
part to the pioneering advocacy of African American feminists, the women’s 
 
AMERICA (1984). 
52 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
53 MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 51. 
54 Id. at 53 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Phillips, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 69-1058)). 
55 Id. at 54. 
56 “A House report declared that ‘women’s rights are not judicial divertissements,’ and 
that sex discrimination was ‘to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any 
type of unlawful discrimination.’” Id. at 55. 
57 Id. at 56. 
58 Id. (citing MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 131-32). 
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movement and civil rights advocates had formed a powerful alliance—and 
Title VII was among its most potent weapons. 
Intersectionality did not only inform an oppositional critique of employment 
discrimination law; intersectional experience also proved a constructive, 
integrative force in expanding Title VII’s substantive reach.59 Two striking 
examples involve discrimination against unmarried mothers and the 
development of sexual harassment as a harm prohibited under Title VII.60 In 
both instances, African American women pioneered as plaintiffs in cases that 
redefined employment practices once seen as “natural” and legitimate as 
violations of women’s civil rights. 
Before Title VII, employers could, and did, discriminate against women 
based on sex, marital status, or both. After Title VII’s passage, marriage bars 
and anti-nepotism rules continued to prevent many women from obtaining or 
retaining jobs when they married. Also common were formal or informal rules 
prohibiting the employment of unmarried mothers or parents known to have 
“illegitimate” children.61 Initially, civil rights advocates challenged these 
policies as racially discriminatory: for instance, in 1968, the NAACP LDF 
filed a suit against Southwestern Bell for excluding “unwed mothers” from 
employment.62 An Arkansas federal district court judge rejected the LDF’s 
arguments: “[M]ore Negro women have illegitimate children than do white 
women,” he acknowledged, but this fact, though “interesting sociologically,” 
did not render the policy unlawful.63 Employers had a “legitimate interest at 
least to a point in the sexual behavior of [their] employees and their morale 
while at work. A woman who has had an illegitimate child,” Judge Jesse Smith 
Henley wrote, “can well have an upsetting effect on other employees . . . .”64 
Even if “certain classes of Negroes have a different attitude toward 
extramarital sex than do most white people,” he wrote, Title VII did not 
“require[] an employer to conform his standards to the Negro attitude.”65 
Judge Henley did not consider whether Southwestern Bell’s exclusion of 
unmarried mothers might violate Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination, but 
others soon did.66 When an African American woman rejected for a job as a 
telephone operator filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC in 1970, 
the employer explained that her status as an unwed mother, not her race, was 
 
59 I develop this argument with respect to constitutional law in MAYERI, REASONING 
FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 144-85. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 145-67.  
62 Id. at 153 (citing Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., No. LR-68-C-81, 1969 
WL 109 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969)). 
63 Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell, 1969 WL at *9). 
64 Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell, 1969 WL at *9). 
65 Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell, 1969 WL at *9). 
66 Id. 
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the basis for its decision not to hire her.67 The EEOC ruled that the employer’s 
policy discriminated based on race and sex, in violation of Title VII.68 Since 
“80 percent of ‘illegitimate’ births in the surrounding community were to ‘non-
white females,’” the disproportionate impact constituted race discrimination.69 
And even if the employer had attempted to apply the “illegitimacy standard” to 
unmarried fathers too, the decision noted, “it’s a wise employer indeed that 
knows which of its male applicants truthfully answered its illegitimacy 
inquiry.”70 Thus, the EEOC declared, the “foreseeable and certain impact of an 
illegitimacy standard . . . is to deprive females . . . of employment 
opportunities.”71 In short, the intersection of race and sex alerted judges and 
administrators to the multifaceted discriminatory impact of employment bans 
based on non-marital childbearing. 
African American women also led the way in expanding Title VII’s sex 
discrimination provision to proscribe sexual harassment.72 Historically, women 
of color had been especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation at the hands of 
employers. Black female plaintiffs, primed by their experiences with racial 
discrimination and harassment, brought many of the early cases against 
employers that characterized sexual objectification and coercion in the 
workplace as wrongful civil rights violations, rather than interpersonal 
problems to be endured in silence.73 During her years in local and federal 
government, Eleanor Holmes Norton was among the first government officials 
to recognize and combat sexual harassment.74 Black feminist legal 
practitioners and scholars such as Judy Trent Ellis (later Judy Scales-Trent) 
used sexual harassment law as a basis for larger critiques of courts’ failure to 
grapple with intersectionality.75 Long before Anita Hill’s testimony at Clarence 
Thomas’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings transformed her into the 
foremost spokesperson against sexual harassment and an inspiration for a new 
 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (citing EEOC Decision No. 71-332, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1016 (1970)). 
69 Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 71-332, at 1016). 
70 Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 71-332, at 1017). 
71 Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 71-332, at 1017). 
72 Carrie N. Baker, Race, Class, and Sexual Harassment in the 1970s, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 
7 (2004); see also MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 144. This history is 
more familiar to legal scholars. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 127-41 (1979); Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1469-70 (1992) (“Perhaps 
it is due to this racialization of sexual harassment that Black women are disproportionate[ly] 
represented as plaintiffs in these cases. . . . Racism may provide the clarity to see that sexual 
harassment is . . . an intentional act of sexual discrimination . . . .”). 
73 See BAKER, supra note 8, at 15-17.  
74 See id. at 32, 115.  
75 See id. at 98-99; Judy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of 
Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 30-45 (1981). 
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wave of intersectionality scholarship, intersectional experience shaped the 
recognition and litigation of sexual harassment as sex discrimination. 
The process of translating and generalizing the particular experiences of 
women of color into a universal language of sex discrimination often caused 
race and intersectional insights to fade from view, however.76 This 
“whitewashing” of Title VII law reflected a larger trend in antidiscrimination 
law. African American feminists’ triumphs in the 1970s came at a price. 
Putting a white face on feminists’ agenda increasingly seemed expedient, 
especially to advocates intent on building coalitions to resist the headwinds of 
an increasingly conservative political climate.77 Employment policies that 
targeted single mothers, for example, “affected a wide swath of women, and 
universalizing their appeal could broaden feminists’ constituency and defuse 
troubling stereotypes” about black unwed mothers.78  In Title VII cases and in 
sex equality law more generally, discrimination claims’ origins in the 
experiences of black women and in the intersection of race and sex often gave 
way to a focus on “pure” sex discrimination, untainted by the complexities of 
intersectionality.79 
Throughout the 1970s, African American feminists often found themselves 
“torn between [a] universalist approach that emphasized commonalities 
between black and white, male and female, and a more particularistic view that 
focused on minority women’s interests.”80 Balancing these conflicting 
imperatives required a thoughtful amalgam of insider and outsider sensibilities, 
and careful attention to context and audience. When speaking to skeptical 
black women and men, these advocates often argued for strategic alliances 
with white feminists. When acting as government officials, they sometimes 
quietly—but often forcefully—advanced the interests of women of color and 
working-class women, as well as of white women. African American feminists 
spoke to many audiences about how intersectional experiences shaped their 
political outlook and advocacy, and they did not shy away from constructive 
 
76 “By 1980, when the EEOC issued sexual harassment guidelines for public comment, 
some advocates worried that policy makers had forgotten the roots of sexual harassment law 
in the experiences of black women. They insisted that for women of color, sexual 
harassment could not be separated from racial subordination.” MAYERI, REASONING FROM 
RACE, supra note 8, at 145 (citing Carrie N. Baker, Race, Class, and Sexual Harassment in 
the 1970s, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 7, 21-22 (2004)). 
77 On the effects of rightward political drift on feminist legal advocacy during the 1970s, 
see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, 76-106, 186-224. 
78 Id. at 57 (“Like Ida Phillips, other white women challenged job training programs that 
explicitly favored male job seekers, trained women for inferior positions, and focused on job 
categories that excluded women.”); see also id. (“The plight of white or racially non-
specific ‘women’ increasingly dominated feminists’ political lobbying as well as their 
litigation strategy.”). 
79 Id. at 167. 
80 Id. at 57-58. On the whitewashing phenomenon in constitutional sex equality law, see 
id. at 144-85. 
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criticism of anti-racist and feminist movements. Aileen Hernandez, for 
instance, grew fond of quoting a young black poet’s reproach to white women 
activists, concluding with the line, “‘We share all of your problems; we share 
few of mine.’”81 
IV. TITLE VII AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERSECTIONALITY AS A CATEGORY 
OF CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Despite the integral role of intersectional experiences in informing the 
origins and early development of Title VII, court opinions that acknowledged, 
much less discussed, intersectionality were few and far between. In some 
cases, judges explicitly rejected the notion that plaintiffs suffering from what 
would later be called intersectional or complex bias could find refuge in Title 
VII. By the late 1980s, an intersectionality anti-canon had emerged, featuring 
cases such as DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division,82 which 
rejected the claim of Emma DeGraffenreid and her co-workers that a GM 
plant’s “last hired-first fired” layoff policy discriminated against black women 
and seemed to foreclose the possibility of bringing combined race-sex 
discrimination claims; Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.,83 where a court 
upheld the employer’s ban on a “corn row” hairstyle against a Title VII 
challenge by an African American woman; and Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, 
Inc.,84 which denied a black female plaintiff’s motion to represent a class that 
included white women. 
The intersectionality anti-canon helped to inspire and inform a new 
generation of scholarship and advocacy. Beginning in the early 1980s, EEOC 
lawyer and later law professor Judy Scales-Trent published several articles 
highlighting Title VII’s failure to address black women’s workplace 
experiences.85 Indeed, many if not most of the early classics of intersectionality 
legal scholarship featured Title VII cases as primary evidence of 
 
81 Id. at 58. 
82 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (“[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race 
discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.”). 
For more on the factual background of DeGraffenreid, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, 
supra note 8, at 102-04. 
83 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
84 708 F.2d. 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983). 
85 Trent Ellis, supra note 75, at 39-44 (describing the reluctance of courts to allow black 
women to claim discrimination under Title VII based on both racial and sexual harassment); 
Judy Scales-Trent, Comparable Worth: Is This a Theory for Black Workers?, 8 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 51, 53-54 (1984); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: 
Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 16-20 (1989) 
(discussing black women’s intersectional Title VII claims). For an early analysis of the 
difficulty of bringing race-plus-sex discrimination class action claims, see Elaine W. 
Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment 
Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1980). 
  
728 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:713 
 
antidiscrimination law’s essentialist, exclusionary, and one-dimensional 
approach to identity and to subordination. Crenshaw’s foundational 1989 
article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, critiqued 
DeGraffenreid and two other Title VII cases in which courts rejected African 
American women as representative plaintiffs in class actions involving black 
men and white women.86 The centerpiece of Regina Austin’s classic Sapphire 
Bound!, published the same year, was Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club87—
Crystal Chambers’ Title VII challenge to her termination for a non-marital 
pregnancy.88 Paulette Caldwell’s A Hair Piece, published in 1991, famously 
dissected Rogers v. American Airlines and placed employers’ discriminatory 
grooming policies in the larger context of black women’s denigration and 
subordination in and out of the workplace.89 
Title VII attracted the attention of intersectionality theorists for several 
reasons. First and perhaps foremost, the anti-canon included court opinions 
that seemed spectacularly oblivious to the realities of black women’s 
workplace experiences.90 In addition, the categorical language of the 
provision—banning discrimination “because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin”91—and the relative paucity of officially 
recognized legislative history provided little guidance on how to address 
complex or multiple claims. Perhaps most obviously, Title VII cases forced 
courts to address directly what was often an unspoken subtext in other kinds of 
cases—the racial and gender dynamics of human behavior.92 
The intersectional critique of Title VII doctrine that emerged in the late 
1980s and early 1990s had several dimensions. Many anti-canonical opinions 
made the basic error of dismissing black women’s complaints of 
discrimination because white women and black men had not suffered 
 
86 Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 140 (describing how the “single-axis framework” for 
viewing discrimination claims “erases Black women in the conceptualization, identification 
and remediation of race and sex discrimination”). 
87 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d sub nom., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 
834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). 
88 Austin, supra note 2, at 550-58. 
89 Caldwell, supra note 2, at 366-72. Other early articles on intersectionality and Title 
VII include Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21 (1991); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, 
Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 
CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1991); and Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women’s 
Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457 (1989). 
90 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
92 On the difficulty of unearthing the dynamics of race, gender, and class in legal fields 
such as torts and contracts, see Austin, supra note 2, at 546-48 (describing the challenges of 
conducting research based on legal problems specific to black women because judicial 
opinions often pay “no attention to race, sex, and class”). 
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discrimination.93 Others baldly denied the reality of American cultural 
practices and their social meaning by, for example, deeming policies that 
prohibited traditional African American hairstyles race- and sex-neutral.94 
Some opinions reflected the reluctance of courts to allow black women to 
represent non-black women or black men in class actions, or, as Crenshaw put 
it, judges’ preferences for “pure” sex discrimination claims uncomplicated by 
racial hierarchy or bias.95 
Even decisions that ostensibly recognized the possibility of intersectional 
claims proved to be of limited utility to plaintiffs, scholars charged. The Fifth 
Circuit opinion in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Association,96 
for instance, contained encouraging language allowing black women to bring 
combined race/sex discrimination claims, but employed an awkward “sex-
plus” analysis.97 In Chambers, the court recognized the viability of a pregnant, 
unmarried, black woman’s Title VII claim only to find that the employer’s 
desire to provide positive “role models” for young black girls was a business 
necessity.98 In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,99 the court allowed African 
American women to “aggregate” evidence of racial and sexual harassment, but 
implied that race and sex discrimination were “additive” rather than 
inextricably intertwined, mutually reinforcing, and manifest in particular 
stereotypes, epithets, and abuses directed toward female employees of color.100 
These Title VII decisions informed broader critiques of anti-discrimination 
law and of anti-racist and feminist movements—critiques that contained 
echoes of earlier generations even as they broke new ground. Crenshaw’s 1989 
article, for instance, sounded familiar themes about black women’s 
marginalization within anti-racist and feminist movements and agendas, about 
interpretations of Title VII that undermined potential coalitions and pitted 
subordinated subgroups against one another, and about the lasting impact of 
the Moynihan Report on the American political imagination.101 
 
93 DeGraffenreid is the main exemplar. 413 F. Supp. 142, 144 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).  
94 See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
95 See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 143-50 (discussing Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, 708 
F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983), and Payne v. Travenol, 416 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Miss. 1976)). 
96 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
97 Id. at 1032-33. For an in-depth discussion of the shortcomings of “sex-plus” analysis 
for intersectional cases, see Kotkin, supra note 6, at 1463-81. For more on Jefferies, see 
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 197-98. 
98 Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 834 F.2d 697, 703 (8th Cir. 1987). 
99 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). 
100 Id. at 1416-17.  
101 See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 140, 163-166 (discussing how focus on “race- and 
class-privileged women” in sex discrimination cases “contributes to the marginalization of 
Black women in feminist theory and antiracist politics,” and the “latest versions of a 
Moynihanesque analysis”). 
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By the Civil Rights Act’s thirtieth anniversary, a rich body of 
intersectionality legal scholarship, prominently featuring Title VII cases as 
nemeses, had emerged.102 Although a number of courts had, by the early 
1990s, recognized the viability of combined race/sex discrimination claims, 
legal scholar Kathryn Abrams concluded in 1994 that judges’ application of 
Title VII to “complex” claims and identities sorely lacked the depth, nuance, 
and sophistication of the growing interdisciplinary body of scholarship on 
intersectionality.103 Even decisions ostensibly friendlier to intersectional 
plaintiffs than the anti-canonical rulings often equivocated about the viability 
of complex claims, or simply failed adequately to analyze their legal, 
historical, and moral basis.104 
Twenty years later, judicial opinions containing thoughtful analysis of 
intersectional claims remain few and far between; legal theory and scholarship 
on intersectionality continue to vastly outpace actual Title VII doctrine.105 To 
this day, there is no robust canon of intersectionality case law.106 Moreover, 
recent studies of how claims of “complex bias” fare in court reflect a difficult 
climate for plaintiffs who claim multiple or intersectional forms of 
employment discrimination.107 Class actions of any sort are even more difficult 
to bring,108 and disparate impact theories increasingly come under attack.109 
The picture is not entirely bleak, however, especially if we look beyond 
doctrine. African American women and other women of color continue to play 
leading roles as plaintiffs, attorneys, policymakers, and legal strategists, and to 
sustain enduring and effective coalitions between civil rights and feminist 
 
102 See sources cited supra note 2. 
103 Abrams, supra note 2. 
104 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
105 The literature on intersectionality is far too various and voluminous to do it justice 
here. For a small sampling of recent theoretical and interdisciplinary work on 
intersectionality, see Symposium, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory, 
38 SIGNS 785 (2013). 
106 The scholarly consensus seems to be that Lam v. University of Hawaii, a 1994 Ninth 
Circuit case, was the “high water mark” for intersectionality doctrine. Kotkin, supra note 6, 
at 1475 (discussing Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994)). MacKinnon also 
praises Jeffers v. Thompson, a 2003 federal district court case recognizing that “sex and race 
can ‘fuse inextricably’ so that ‘made flesh in a person, they indivisibly intermingle.’” 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Intersectionality as Method: A Note, 38 SIGNS 1019, 1020 
(quoting Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d. 314, 326 (D. Md. 2003)). 
107 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (rejecting 
female plaintiffs’ argument for class certification on commonality grounds). 
109 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) (holding that before an 
employer can take a race-conscious action to avoid disparate impact, the employer must 
have a “strong basis in evidence” to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if 
it fails to do so); id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning the constitutionality of Title 
VII’s disparate impact provision). 
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organizations. Latinas, Asian-American women, LGBTQ individuals, and 
others have joined African American women at the forefront of intersectional 
advocacy as well as theory.110 And, of course, litigation success is but one 
measure of political and legal efficacy. Legislative lobbying, public education 
campaigns, workplace initiatives, and other forms of advocacy increasingly 
feature spokespersons and causes that reflect the insights of intersectionality. 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the relative silence about intersectionality in employment 
discrimination jurisprudence, intersectionality played a central role in the early 
development of Title VII and in the later emergence of critical legal 
scholarship on anti-discrimination law. Pauli Murray’s own complex identity 
and insider/outsider status led her—and other black feminist leaders such as 
Eleanor Holmes Norton and Aileen Hernandez—to believe that a civil rights-
feminist coalition was crucial to African American women’s advancement. 
Their pioneering advocacy helped Title VII become the glue that held this 
crucial alliance together in the 1970s. The intersectional experiences of women 
of color also contributed mightily to important expansions of Title VII’s 
coverage. For instance, early cases challenging employment bans on unmarried 
mothers often featured women of color claiming race and sex discrimination, 
and African American women played an integral role in the early litigation and 
enforcement of sexual harassment law. Intersectionality’s triumph was double-
edged, however, as race and other complex identities often faded from legal 
advocacy in favor of “pure” sex discrimination and racially non-specific 
women as standard-bearers. 
The marginalization of intersectional claims by social movements and legal 
decision-makers helped to inspire scholarly breakthroughs in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and beyond. Much as the feminist reaction to the Moynihan Report proved 
productive in crystallizing a powerful critique of the male-breadwinner/female-
homemaker model as a prerequisite for racial progress, the critical race 
feminist response to courts’ skepticism about intersectional claims catalyzed an 
influential and field-changing scholarly movement that resonated far beyond 
the realm of employment discrimination law or even legal doctrine itself. But a 
half-century after Pauli Murray promoted an intersectional Title VII, the law 
has yet to reciprocate. 
 
110 For a contemporaneous assessment of the politics of coalition, see, for example, Mari 
J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 1183 (1991). For a study of intersectional advocacy in one feminist legal 
organization, see Judy Scales-Trent, Equal Rights Advocates: Addressing the Legal Issues of 
Women of Color, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 34 (1998). Intersectionality and related 
concepts have also influenced European law and scholarship. For a critical perspective on 
recent developments in EU law, see Jess Bullock & Annick Masselot, Multiple 
Discrimination and Intersectional Disadvantages: Challenges and Opportunities in the 
European Union Legal Framework, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 57 (2012-13). 
